In Central Asian states, China’s enlarged commitment grants many

In recent years, Central Asia has emerged
from a peripheral situation to becoming one of the top significances in China’s
foreign policy plan. China has attempted to develop and strengthen its ties
with the five Central Asian states which are Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan,
Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan.1 Initially
the key emphasis of its political and ambassadorial actions was to resolve
disputed border issue, a soviet legacy. Its connections with Central Asia later
on started to reproduce an increasing need to shield wider commercial and
security benefits in the region. China and Central Asia are geographically
neighbors due to which Central Asia proposes China the outlook of a transportation
passage for overland communication amongst China and Europe, in return China provides
Central Asia safe and protected path to Pacific Ocean. China and Central Asia used
to enjoy common prosperity in ancient times through the Silk Road, but this linkage
was then detached. After the Soviet collapse, a new chapter of history in the linkage
between China and Central Asia began. China’s tactical emphasis towards Central
Asia is often labeled as March West.2
Beijing sees regional integration with Central Asia as important because it offers
both challenges and chances to its security, political, and economic benefits
in the region. This contributes to safeguarding energy supplies and shielding
the stability located in the province of Xinjiang. For the five Central Asian states,
China’s enlarged commitment grants many chances and encounter at a serious stage
in the region’s past. China’s stance on most disputes around the globe is that
they can be solved by joint understanding, genuine dialogue and diplomatic talks
instead of any external interference. Although security and development are the
key concerns confronting Central Asia, so it would be really interesting to see
how security and development are interpreted by Chinese Ministry.

China and CAR
states in 2st century:

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Beginning in the first half of the
1990s right after the breakup of the Soviet Union, China very speedily became concerned
about the relation interwoven between the newly emerged nations of Central Asia
and NATO, identifying a danger that the impact of the United States would be prolonged
under a justification of containment of Chinese influence.3 With
regard to this concern, China had to launch numerous research programs that
mainly focused on NATO and demonstrated a fresh plea to create uninterrupted links
with NATO representatives. For Chinese administration, this was in fact very evidently
a matter of an aggression by external entities that were in struggle to control
the security paradox in the region. At the mutual level, China has equally instituted
a sequence of strategic partnerships with all of the Central Asian states, the
full designations of which nevertheless bear spectator to a fine attainment in
relations between the two entities. Chinas partnership with Kazakhstan is
termed strategic and regarded as highest level because Kazakhstan is the most complex
state for motives with regards to its geographic contiguity to the slims ties
that lie with Xinjiang but also is known to the probability for collaboration
in the field of energy. The other republics on the other hand are considered
less strategic. With Kyrgyzstan, there is a good strategic partnership and
friendly ties, with Uzbekistan a partnership of approachable teamwork and with
Tajikistan a partnership of good neighborliness(as both countries share border)
and friendly cooperation directed towards the 21st century and with Turkmenistan
relations of friendly cooperation for the 21st century on the basis of equality
and the common interest.4
But along with the concern for stability for Beijing, right after the collapse
of the USSR, the query in this profound region of increasing its scope of impact
or advantages benefit arises. After the 9 11 attacks, China tried to reclaim
the greater hand by aligning itself for an early period with the apparently shared
subject of the fight against terrorism. The fight against terror in fact enabled
Beijing to extricate itself from the countries that were termed as the axis of
evil by Bush administration to whom China in reality had greater ties with, and
also at the same time in its own analysis it wanted the threat of terrorist and
separatist militants in Xinjiang to be acknowledged by global community. The strategy
proved to be successful as it can be found in the recordkeeping by Washington
of ETIM (East Turkestan Independence Movement), a nevertheless very negligible separatist’s
movement in Xinjiang on its list of terrorist outfits.  China’s rise in Central Asia has further
accelerated the struggle among great powers in order guard their interests in
region, which has similarities to the old Great Game, an era of strong conflict
between the British and Russian empires in the 19th century as both empires were
in continuous race to increase their influence in Central Asia. Along with
Russia and the US, other foremost powers such as the EU, Turkey and India have
different economic, political and security welfares to hunt in Central Asia and
are considered to be new players of the new great game.

Economic and
Security Aspects:

In terms of security, China and the
nations of Central Asia share mutual benefits that involve the movements of
ethnic separatists, religious extremists and the danger of transnational crime,
terrorism and regional tussle. China expanded its energy partnership with
Central Asia during President Xi’s visit to Central Asian states in September.
In Turkmenistan which is China’s principal natural gas dealer, Xi announced the
inaugural of the world’s second-biggest gas field in production, in Kazakhstan,
a USD 30 billion agreement containing some stake in Kashagan oilfield was
signed; in Uzbekistan, another USD 15 billion agreement of oil gas and uranium
was made. In terms of economics, China and the Central Asian states have corresponding
benefits that propose the opportunity of widespread collaboration of both
entities. For China, the energy means, metals, leather merchandises and other supplies
along with raw materials and marketplaces of Central Asia are very significant.  The encounter brought by the new order to
China is far dissimilar from that of the Central Asian states as it’s an
influential socialist state among other developing states. China plays a very
crucial and enduring part in the universal Stage. China has been following sovereign,
independent domestic and foreign dogmas. China and Central Asia will play
significant roles in global political and economic matters in future without
any doubt. China has a strong economy and obeys to the procedure of restructuring
and opening to the whole world. China’s military collaboration with other SCO states focuses largely on joint and multidimensional
counter-terrorism exercises, which are conducted on a regular basis every year.
The SCO Council of Ministers of
Foreign Affairs in November 2002 implemented the Provisional Scheme of
Relations between the Shanghai Cooperation Organization and Other International
Organizations and countries, officially starting external relations of SCO.5 The
basis for this development is the Xinjiang Autonomous Region in far northwest
China. This autonomous region holds 3,700 kilometer-long border of China with
Central Asia, which makes it the only feasible shortest land bridge between the
Han Chinese essential provinces and the remaining of southern Eurasia.6 It
also comprises of Karakoram Pass, China’s only overland passage to Pakistan and
then reaches to the Chinese operated Port of Gwadar located in Southern coast
of Pakistan. These important factors of Xinjiang can aid in explaining
Xinjiang’s ancient heritage as home to the epic Silk Road trading passages, along
with the stiff ethnic, cultural and religious links that endure to impasse
Xinjiang’s Uighur ethnic majority to the Turkic people of Central Asia and elsewhere.
Today, Chinese leaders are vigorously vitalizing these heritages as seen in Xi
Jinping’s latest demand for a new Silk Road Economic Zone covering Xinjiang and
its Central Asian neighbors.

Conclusion:

China’s desires in Central Asia face
many restraints. Distance and terrain pose huge cost and logistical encounter
to across-the-board trans-Eurasian transportation, while a constantly unstable
security condition in almost every way of the Greater Central Asian region
including Xinjiang will intimidate Beijing’s vision of dropping its acquaintance
to supply disruption of energy resources. 
The ever-changing geopolitical landscape in Central Asia has a vast
number of consequences for EU benefits.7 The
EU is second largest trading partner of Central Asia, so its main interest lies
in the energy field. China’s policy with respect to Central Asia hence discloses
a capability for adaptation, flexibility and a logicality that gaps with its
policy. Elsewhere the exploration for partnerships with dictatorial states that
share Beijing’s disbelief of the approaches of regime change introduced by the
United States, the ideological dimension is in effect lacking from the relationships
between China and Central Asia. In political aspect, Chinese leaders brought
forward a procedure of keeping good relations with the neighbors, preserving
safe bordering linkages while bringing prosperity to neighbors. This policy was
to advance a strategically shared association in a longer term and welcoming
way by signing a series of vital permissible papers, to respect the sovereignty
and territorial integrity of the Central Asian states. Out of six, four associates
of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization involve Central Asian states and this is
a good example of how great cooperation will be systematized. China will work watchfully
with all Central Asian states to maintain regional stability as well as to increase
economic and cultural relations. Enduring collaboration between China and the
Central Asian states within the outline of the SCO
can assist in serving regional economic integration and can also help solve mutual
security and development snags. Although China is unable resolve alone any
future crises in Central Asia to safeguard its own benefits. Through its diplomatic
associations and growing economic commitment, China does have an influence on
the internal matters of Central Asia. But China’s participation and influence on
security aspects has been very uncertain compared to its broader economic activities,
largely revolving around the SCO, which
is China’s chief multidimensional instrument in the region and has proved sometimes
incapable to act in times of catastrophe such as the 2010 ethnic conflict in Kyrgyzstan.